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Scottish residents headed to the polls on 18 September 2014 to decide whether 
Scotland should sever its ties with the United Kingdom and become an independent 
country. The ‘no’ vote obtained a robust 55% majority while the ‘yes’ campaign still 
managed to attract over 1,600,000 votes from those who exercised their right to cast a 
ballot. 
   
The Union with England dating back to 1707 remains thus intact, as indeed does the 
place of Scotland within the United Kingdom. A new referendum on independence is not 
on the cards for the foreseeable future. And yet, the ‘no’ vote was hardly a vote for the 
status quo. The Westminster political leadership’s last minute pledge to grant more 
powers to Scotland in the wake of the devolution process that started in the 1990s has 
already triggered what in the eyes of many observers is bound to be a complex and 
protracted constitutional debate. The expected outcome is the reworking of the 
relationship between London and Edinburgh and, ultimately, between Scotland and the 
rest of the UK. The jury, I suspect, will be out for some time to come. 
 
Leaving these internal complexities aside, one might raise the question of how 
international law relates to the Scottish case, specifically in the context of the right of 
‘peoples’ to self-determination. What does international law have to say about 
secession, or the identity of the claimant, or autonomy within the state? And, 
conversely, what could the aftermath of the Scottish vote contribute to the self-
determination debate itself? This Reflection will briefly explore three international legal 
dimensions that directly or indirectly interface with the main themes of the Scottish 
debate: independence, autonomy, and democratic participation.   
 
I. A Right to Unilateral Secession for the People of Scotland? 
 
One can safely argue that the case for Scottish independence does not change the 
terms of the debate regarding unilateral secession. If anything, the case reaffirms the 
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limitations of secessionist claims from an international legal perspective. While the ‘yes’ 
campaign (and partly the media) occasionally appealed to the notion of ‘self-
determination’ for Scotland, unsurprisingly no one ever invoked a right to secede from 
the UK unilaterally under constitutional or international law. Indeed, leading practice 
advised against this. As is well known, in the Reference case1 the Canadian Supreme 
Court, faced with the question of whether Quebec had the right to unilateral secession 
from Canada as part of Quebec’s ‘right to self-determination’ in international law, had 
restated the legal mantra against the existence of such unilateral entitlement. The Court 
conceded the possibility of ‘remedial’ secession under circumstances (denial of access 
to government) that clearly did not apply to Quebec, regardless of the precise 
international legal status of that particular option. There is no doubt that the same line of 
reasoning applies to Scotland as well. In short, international law practice – old and new 
– could not have come to the rescue of the ‘yes’ campaign to frame a positive legal 
claim to independence.       
 
In reality, that was not the real objective of the independence movement. The process 
initiated by London and Edinburgh by setting a date for the referendum was meant to 
foster constitutional conversations between the centre and the periphery, rather than 
endorse any genuinely unilateral moves. This approach echoes the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s central concern in the Reference case that the relevant parties engage in 
meaningful and good faith negotiations in order to secure a legitimate process of self-
determination which affects the state as a whole. And crucially, those negotiations in the 
Court’s argument did not require the recognition of Quebec as a ‘people’ for self-
determination purposes to the extent that a clear majority within the Province of Quebec 
had expressed the intention to pursue a separatist path.  
 
Arguably, the split within the ‘people of Scotland’ between the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ vote can 
only confirm the fuzziness of the concept and its multiple variants within established 
states. Conceptually it mirrors the split within ‘the people of Quebec’ between the 
French-speaking separatists and other sectors of Quebec that have consistently 
opposed independence, including English speakers and indigenous groups. Here, 
again, international law practice, particularly international jurisprudence, could have not 
provided the pro-independence Scots with an unqualified positive answer to the 
question of ‘peoplehood’ for distinctive sub-national units within the state as opposed to 
a general ‘pluralist’ conception of the state population.2 Rather both the Quebec and 
Scottish cases (and by analogy, comparable cases too) seem to suggest the 
international legal elusiveness of that vocabulary to support self-determination claims 
beyond the context of colonization as long as the viability of self-determination itself 
(possibly including the option of independence) largely hinges on the domestic working 
out of the relationship between the central government, the sub-national unit and other 
                                               
1
 Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
2
 It is quite telling that the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, the Canadian Supreme Court and the 
International Court of Justice have all shied away from these matters: European Community Arbitration 
Commission, Opinion No. 2 (1992) 31 ILM 1497; Reference Re Secession of Quebec, n. 1; Accordance 
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory 
Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, paras 51, 56, 82. 
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affected parties, no matter how that unit has styled itself (people, nation, region, 
province, national minority, or otherwise).3   
 
II. Scotland as a Case of Internal Self-determination in Human Rights Law  
 
While the failed push for Scottish independence does not detract from the lack of an 
international legal basis for unilateral secession (leaving the matter to internally-
negotiated solutions), for its part the ‘no’ vote, when seen through the prism of 
international human rights law, does confirm ‘autonomy’ as a viable, albeit not 
exclusive, form of internal self-determination within diverse societies.  
 
This has been openly acknowledged in a variety of global and regional human rights 
settings. In Katangese Peoples’ Congress,4 for example, involving a claim to 
independence by Katanga under Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, the African Commission emphatically noted that self-determination 
could be exercised in ways that included self-government, local government or 
federalism, among others, as long as that was in tune with the wishes of the people. 
Tellingly, the Commission declined to dwell on the Katangese as consisting of one or 
more ethnic groups.5  
 
Similarly, international human rights standards on ‘minorities’ and ‘indigenous peoples’, 
while deliberately foreclosing  rights to secession, either justify various models of 
autonomy as legitimate methods of securing group participation and representation 
within the wider polity or explicitly endorse self-government as the central dimension of 
internal self-determination for the relevant group.6 In both cases autonomy regimes are 
presumed to be compatible with the principle of equality. And international jurisprudence 
too broadly echoes this pattern: international courts have generally assumed the 
legitimacy of minority autonomy regimes subject to certain individual rights guarantees 
(from the minority regime in Italy’s Trentino to Northern Ireland’s power-sharing 
arrangements), or even required appropriate forms of indigenous self-government as a 
way of effecting rights to land and resources.7  
                                               
3
 It is worth noting that the UK is a party to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities and, within this framework, it recognises the Scots as a ‘national 
minority’. For a broader argument about self-determination, including indigenous groups, see Gaetano 
Pentassuglia, ‘Ethnocultural Diversity and Human Rights: Legal Categories, Claims, and the Hybridity of 
Group Protection’(2014) 6 Yearbook of Polar Law 192, 208-216 (forthcoming). 
4
 Katangese Peoples' Congress v Zaire African Comm Hum and Peoples’ Rights, Comm No 75/92 
(1995).  
5
 For a thoughtful review of regional human rights practice, see e.g., Dinah Shelton, ‘Self-determination in 
Regional Human Rights Law: From Kosovo to Cameroon’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International 
Law 60. 
6
 See e.g. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), ‘Document  
of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE’ (1990), para 35; 
UNGA ‘United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (13 September 2007)  UN Doc 
A/RES/61/295, particularly arts 3,4,5,18,19.  
7
 For examples and discussion, see Gaetano Pentassuglia, Minority Groups and Judicial Discourse in 
International Law: A Comparative Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 125-133; Pentassuglia, ‘The 
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Thus, in a sense Scottish autonomy is one of many ways in which self-determination 
can be articulated within the state. However, what problematizes autonomist stances 
(especially when linked to claims to ever-greater territorially-based powers) is their 
relational dimension, that is, their impact on the rights of others, be they individuals or 
groups, within specific contexts.8 From this point of view, international human rights law 
provides the London-Edinburgh parties with a major framework for not only enabling 
self-government within the state but also calibrating properly its scope on a case-by-
case basis.      
 
III. The Scottish Debate as Best Practice in Political Participation 
 
If that is the case, then the Scottish referendum and the subsequent proposals for 
Scotland’s enhanced autonomy in the context of an emerging federal structure within 
the United Kingdom are bound to enrich the body of material practice that has 
contributed to distilling power-sharing models over a considerable period of time, 
particularly in Western Europe. In this respect, the impact of the Scottish scenario on 
the reach of (internal) self-determination is expected to be twofold. It is likely to 
represent an important example of ‘best practice’ for broadly comparable contexts. 
While there was a sense that Scottish independence might have set a dangerous 
precedent for other separatist entities to follow, thereby creating havoc and further 
fragmentation within an already fragile European architecture, quasi-federal solutions to 
the Scottish case might be usefully explored in other contexts where ‘self-determination’ 
claims have been made – from Catalonia to eastern Ukraine.9 This is even more so if 
one looks at Scotland as an arguably successful case of peaceful reconciliation of 
regional identity and pro-European stance.10  
 
But even more fundamentally, the Scottish debate reveals the crucial importance of 
participatory approaches to central and regional governance, particularly in cases of 
historically ‘less-than-voluntary’ processes of state formation.11 Just as Canada’s 
French-speaking community was pivotal to the development of a multinational 
democracy in that context, so Scotland’s participation in the Union remains a 
                                                                                                                                                       
Strasbourg Court and Minority Groups: Shooting in the Dark or a New Interpretive Ethos?’ (2012) 19 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 1, 11-13. 
8
 Inevitably some power-sharing cases will prove more controversial than others from a human rights 
perspective: in relation to the Bosnian case see, e.g., Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, 
‘Courts and Consociations or How Human Rights Courts May De-stabilize Power-sharing Settlements’ 
(2013) 24 European Journal of International Law 477.  
9
 It is worth noting that, as a result of constitutional and political difficulties, Catalonia has cancelled its 
referendum on independence and will be holding an unofficial poll instead. Ashifa Kassam,  ‘Catalonia to 
Hold Unofficial Poll instead of Independence Referendum’ The Guardian (Madrid, 14 October 2014) 
˂http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/14/catalonia-calls-off-november-independence-referendum˃ 
accessed 6 November 2014. 
10
 Serge Schememann, ‘Fostering National Identity but not Nationalism’, The New York Times 
(25September 2014) ˂http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/opinion/fostering-national-identity-but-not-
nationalism.html?_r=0˃ accessed 6 November 2014, 8.  
11
 Rainer Bauböck, ‘Liberal Justifications for Ethnic Group Rights’ in Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes 
(eds), Multicultural Questions (OUP 1999) 134, 140. 
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foundational component of the United Kingdom as a state. In both cases (and far 
beyond them), internal self-determination processes become inevitably intertwined with 
the role of group protection (on a political-institutional or more loosely cultural basis) in 
addressing distinctive power deficits arising out of the establishment of multinational 
states.12 International law has supported such processes through an increasingly 
sophisticated notion of representative government as first articulated in the 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and then revisited in the 1993 Vienna Declaration on 
human rights and a range of subsequent specialized instruments – from generic rights 
to participation in public affairs to special forms of involvement in decision-making, 
including complex arrangements in deeply divided societies.13   
 
In this sense the Scottish debate over how to reconfigure the relationship between the 
centre and the peripheries (reaching out to all of the UK’s constitutive ‘nations’) – and, 
crucially, how far such a reconfiguration can go14 – speaks to the need for an inclusive 
multi-layered process of participation and accommodation as a way of remedying 
endemic imbalances within the state.   
 
 
                                               
12
 For a more general argument, see Patrick Macklem, ‘Minority Rights in International Law’ (2008) 6 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 531; Rene Kuppe, ‘The Three Dimensions of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 11 International Community Law Review  103.  
13
 Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘State Sovereignty, Minorities and Self-Determination: A Comprehensive Legal 
View’ (2002) 9 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 303.   
14
 For example, there is probably an argument to be made that a federal solution of sorts that secures the 
overall dominance of the English unit would hardly serve the equality purposes that any majority-minority 
relationship needs to address: see e.g. the early pronouncement of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in Minority Schools in Albania (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 64, 3.   
